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THE "COMMON GOOD" AND THE PROBLEM OF
"EQUITY" IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
St. Thomas Aquinas insists that the human or positive
law 1 must always fulfill the conditions requisite to a thing
which has a definite purpose or end. For "it is ordained to an
end," namely "to be useful to man." 2 In addition it must
be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the cus-
tom of the country, suitable to the time and place, neces-
sary, useful, clearly expressed, and framed solely for the
common good.' St. Thomas Aquinas is fully conscious of
the fact that the general principles of Natural Law under-
lying all human laws cannot be applied to all men in the
same manner for all times and in all places. Thus on account
of the great variety of human affairs the human law must
vary among different peoples and nations,4 though its ul-
timate purpose, namely the achievement of the common
good, always remains the same.
Law, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, is something per-
taining to reason, directed "to a definite end, which is the
first principle in all matters of action." ' "Now the first
principle in practical matters . . . is the last end: and the
last end of human life is bliss and happiness.... Consequent-
ly the law must regard principally the relationship to hap-
piness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole,
as imperfect to perfect, and since one man is a part of the
perfect community, the law must regard properly the re-
lationship to universal happiness." 6 "Whenever a thing is
1 As distinguished from the "Lex Aeterna" (see, in general, Summa Theo-
logica, I, II, quaestio 91, art. 1; quaestio 93, art. 3; art. 4) and the "Lex Naturalis"
(see, in general, ibid., quaestio 91, art. 2; quaestio 94, and others).
2 Summa Theologica, I, II, quaestio 95, art. 3.
3 Ibid., quaestio 95, art. 3; art. 1; quaestio 92, art. 1.
4 Ibid., quaestio 95, art. 2.
5 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 1.
6 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 2.
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for an end, its form must be determined proportionally to
that end;" and "everything that is ruled or measured must
have a form proportionate to its rule and measure." ' "Both
these conditions are verified in the human law, since it is
both something ordained to an end; and a rule or measure
ruled or measured by a higher measure." 8 "Now the end
of the human law is to be useful to man... viz.,... that it
further the common weal." 9
"The law is chiefly ordained to the common good." 10
"Any other precept in regard to some individual work must
necessarily be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far
as it regards the common good," 11 for, as we already know,
"every law is ordained to the common good." 12 "Nothing
stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be
directed to the ultimate end which is the common good: and
whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a
law." 13 "Actions are indeed concerned with particular mat-
ters: but those particular matters are referable to the com-
mon good, not as to a common genius or species, but as to a
common final cause, according as the common good is said
to be -the common end." 14 Therefrom follows that "the good-
ness any part is considered in comparison with the whole,"
and that, "since ... every man is a part of the State, it is
impossible that a man be good, unless he is well proportion-
ate to the common good: nor can the whole be well con-
sistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently
the common good of the State cannot flourish, unless the
citizen be virtuous." 11 The common good, the common wel-
fare is, therefore, the true "social good," 16 the one and all
7 Ibid., quaestio 95, art. 3.
8 Ibid., quaestio 95, art. 3.
9 Ibid., quaestio 95, art. 3.
10 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 2.
11 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 2.
12 Compare also ibid., quaestio 90, art. 3; art. 4; quaestio 92, art. 1; quaestio
95, art. 1; art. 3; quaestio 96, art. 6.
13 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 2.
14 Ibid., quaestio 90, art. 2.
15 Ibid., quaestio 92, art. 1.
16 Compare ibid., quaestio 92, art. 1.
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pervading purpose in the human law. Above everything the
social interest of the community, the common good must be
fostered, 7 even should this necessitate certain restrictions of
some personal rights.'"
Any law which concerns itself primarily with the achieve-
ment of the common good, that is, with the social well being
of a definite society must "take into account many things, as
to persons, as to matters, and as to times." 19 "Now it hap-
pens often that the observance of some points of the law 20
conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances,
and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful." 21 Should such a
situation arise the "strict Common Law" should not be ob-
served in order that the common good, which the lawgiver
had in mind, might be fully maintained or achieved." In
other words, the "strict Common Law" must, in certain in-
stances, be supplanted by "Equitable Justice." Thus
"Equity" or, as St. Thomas Aquinas calls it, "Epikeia" 28
becomes a vital part of his general theory of Law and Jus-
tice. According to him "Equity" constitutes but a form or
kind of Justice 24 which is not superior to Justice in general,
but merely superior in some respects to "strict Common Law
Justice," inasmuch as "it is impossible to lay down rules of
Common Law that would apply to every single case. Legis-
17 Ibid., quaestio 96, art. 1.
1s Ibid., quaestio 96, art. 2; quaestio 95, art. 3.
19 Ibid., quaestio 96, art. 1.
20 St. Thomas Aquinas refers here to the "strict positive law," to what we
would call the "strict Common Law." We are fully aware of the fact, however,
that the "strict positive law" of St. Thomas Aquinas does not completely coincide
with our notion of the "strict Common Law," in as much as he is of the opinion
that all human law should be statutory, originating with a definite "lawgiver."
(See footnote 25.)
21 Summa Theologica, I, II, quaestio 96, art. 6.
22 Ibid., quaestio 96, art. 5.
23 St. Thomas Aquinas borrows this mutilated term, which should be spelled
"Epieikeia," from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, book V, chap. 10. See Aristotelis
Opera Omnia (edit. by Academia Regia Borusica, Berlin, 1831). 1137 a 33 f. (page
1137, left hand column (a), line 33). Compare Chroust, Aristotle's Conception of
"Equity" (Epieikeia), in: Notre Dame Lawyer, XVIII, 2.
24 Surnma Theologica, II, II, quaestio 120, art. 1. Compare ibid., art. 2.
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 117
lators in framing laws 2 attend to what commonly happens:
although if the "strict Common Law" be applied to certain
cases it would frustrate the equality of Justice 26 and be in-
jurious to the common good which the law has in view....
In these and like cases it is bad to follow the "strict Com-
mon Law," and it is good to set aside the letter of the "strict
Common Law" and to follow the dictates of Justice and the
common good." 27 For "to follow the letter of the 'strict
Common Law' when it should not be followed is sinful." 28
On the other hand "Equity" does not intend to set aside
what is right and just, nor does it try to pass judgment on a
"strict Common Law rule" by claiming that the latter was
not well made. It merely states that, in the interest of a truly
effective and fair Administration of Justice, the "strict Com-
mon Law" is not to be observed in some particular in-
stance.2" For "without doubt he transgresses the law who by
adhering to the letter of the 'strict Common Law' strives to
defeat the intention of the lawgiver," " and thus obstructs
the ultimate end of all human law, the common good. Ac-
cording to St. Thomas Aquinas the Administration of Jus-
tice should, in its attempt to supplement the ever present
lack of formal sources of the law, or to bridge the gaps in
these sources, take into account the inspirations of reason
and of conscience in order to probe the mystery of the "just"
before coming down to the examination of the positive na-
25 St. Thomas Aquinas is of the opinion that all human law should be statu-
tory. For according to him, in the first place, it is more probable that a few wise
men can be found to frame the (statutory) law, than it is that one would find all
the wise men that would be necessary to judge cases as they arise. Secondly, there
is more time to think while making laws than while judging cases as they arise.
And most important, -these laws would be made in an abstract atmosphere, and
not under the compulsion of human passions and prejudices of the moment. See
Summa Theologica, I, II, quaestio 95, art. 1. Compare also ibid., quaestio 91, art. 4.
28 The concept of equality comes to St. Thomas Aquinas likewise through
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, book V, chap. 10. See, in particular, 1129 a 34;
1130 b 9; 16; 24; 33; 1131 a 10 f.; 12 f.; and others. Compare Chroust and Os-
born, Aristotle's Conception of Justice, in: Notre Dame Lawyer, XVII, 2, p. 130 f.
27 Summa Theologica, II, II, quaestio 120, art. 1; art. 2.
28 Ibid., quaestio 120, art. 1; art. 2.
20 Ibid., quaestio 120, art. 1; art. 2.
3o Ibid., quaestio 120, art. 1.
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ture of things which will settle its diagnosis, and will call in-
to action the principles of reason. For there are principles of
Justice which are superior to the contingencies of fact as
well as to the contingencies of established "Common Law
rules," " and which are embodied in the concept of "Equity"
of St. Thomas Aquinas.
Anton-Hermann Chroust.
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.
31 Compare F. GCny, M~thode d'Interprtation et Sources on Droit Priv6
Positive, vol. II, p. 100 f.
